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Acknowledgments

Producing Economics and Morality has been a work of pleasure from start to finish. From the beginning, we believed the topic was timely and promising for anthropological consideration. We are grateful to the Society for Economic Anthropology (SEA) for selecting our theme for its 2006 annual meeting. In the process of organizing the conference, from which come the papers for this volume, we had the good fortune of help from Paul Rivera of California State University, Channel Islands, who deftly handled all the local arrangements. Thanks to him the Ventura, California, site provided a beautiful ocean setting and facilities that encouraged a genial exchange of ideas. We were fortunate to have drawn a distinguished group of international scholars whose provocative papers kept collective discussions animated and productive. Now, with this book, we aim to build on the energy and insights from this conference and encourage an explicit research agenda devoted to an anthropology of economics and morality.

We are sincerely grateful to all our contributors for sharing their work, enduring multiple rounds of revisions, and making the job of editing this volume a smooth one. We would also like to thank Bill Maurer for generously agreeing to write the afterword for the volume. We wish to thank the three external reviewers of the volume, who provided thorough and incisive comments to each author and contributed to helping all of us achieve a better piece of scholarship. We also thank Dolores Koenig who, as SEA series editor, has been a most supportive coach, shepherding us well through the hoops of preparing an edited volume. We also extend our special thanks to Jack Meinhardt and to all of the production team at AltaMira Press, who have been wonderful to work with.
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—Kate Browne and Lynne Milgram

Economics and Morality: Introduction

Katherine E. Browne

Morality represents the way people would like the world to work—whereas economics represents how it actually does work.

—Stephen Levitt (2005)

Thinking of the market system as morally neutral is dangerous.


Anthropologists are not very happy in the marketplace and this gives many of them a jaundiced perspective on money.

—Keith Hart (2005)

Why is the world today so very different from that of our ancestors? I think we’re unlikely to make progress in answering [the] question if we insist at the outset that “capitalism” just means modern greed.

—Deirdre McCloskey (2006)

Some of us doubt that there is any such thing as morality in the realm of economic life. Some say moral commitments in an economy characterize only precapitalist societies where systems of reciprocity bind people to each other and to the social good. Others point out that capitalist systems are inherently moral because they enshrine the rights of individuals. Today, as capitalism spreads its logic to remote parts of the world, many economists and economic thinkers such as Thomas Friedman (2005) argue that the morality of individual choice is winning the day as globalization and technology work to flatten historic inequalities of opportunity. At the same time, a tiny but
growing minority of economists, such as Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, argue that moral principles will remain absent from neoliberal economies unless we deliberately shift the focus from measures of income growth to measures of human capabilities and different kinds of freedoms. With such wildly disparate assertions about morality and economics, how can we properly evaluate all these competing claims? How do we reckon with the contradictions and confusion of so many different ideas?1

The variability in how people view what constitutes morality requires us to ask: What exactly is morality? Sociologist Andrew Sayer, who has written at length about the "moral economy," offers a robust set of parameters:

The moral concerns lay norms (informal and formal), conventions, values, dispositions and commitments regarding what is just and what constitutes good behavior in relation to others, and implies certain broader conceptions of the good or well-being. (2005)

This definition is useful precisely because it allows us to include religious values and proscriptions, as well as individual and cultural-level views about what is good and right. And, as Sayer (2005) explains, an inclusive view of morality makes possible a consideration not only of how moral ideas are expressed in our economic choices, but also of how the organization of the economy affects social well-being. To think about the relationship of morality and economics is to connect the most abstract and perhaps meaningful realm of human life with the most banal— to consider how the everyday matter of living gets infused with our deepest beliefs of what we live for and how we live well. These fascinating intersections are at the heart of this volume.

AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE VOLUME

In Economics and Morality, we seek to illuminate multiple kinds of analyses relating morality and economic behavior in particular kinds of economic systems. The chapters included here represent fieldwork in indigenous societies of variable scales and degrees of integration with capitalist systems, as well as fieldwork from a variety of capitalist societies, including those organized around welfare-state economies, economies shaped by an Islamic state, and neoliberal Western states. The papers intersect in interesting and numerous ways, but to capture the thrust of their arguments, we have grouped the papers into three sets. In the first set, we include work focused on moral challenges in non-Western economic systems undergoing profound change (Robbins, Walsh, and Little). The second set of papers focuses on grassroots movements and moral claims generated from the ground up in the context of capitalism (Halperin, Prentice, Werner, and Dolan). The third set focuses on new movements taking place within corporate and state institutions to forward a more explicit, moral basis for enacting the terms of capitalist economic behavior (Garsten and Hersch, Rajak, and Pitluck). An afterword by Bill Maurer offers a hopeful perspective to conclude the volume.

The anthropological approach of this volume presents two distinct contributions to the larger discussion of economics and morality in the social sciences. First, anthropological insights draw their value and endurance from on-the-ground, ethnographic investigation. Each of the chapters here presents original analyses anchored to data from firsthand fieldwork. Recognizing and engaging with concrete realities often complicates theory and, in the course of this volume, authors suggest a number of ways that theoretical arguments about the gift and about morality in market systems must be reconsidered to accommodate data on the ground. Second, the anthropological tradition of studying non-Western as well as Western societies brings critical perspectives to both the congruities and discontinuities between very different kinds of societies. In this volume, ethnographic work reveals the relevance of moral systems in contemporary non-Western societies to the understanding of moralities and economies in Western societies.2

The concerns of morality and economics seem intuitively to belong to the fields of philosophy and economics. At one time, during the Enlightenment period in Europe and after the church no longer held sway as the exclusive keeper of knowledge and arbiter of moral principles, moral and economic philosophy constituted a unified area of study. Adam Smith’s own writings during this era of classical political economy reflected the integrated study of morality and economics. But in the late eighteenth century, the holistic approach of Western classical studies to the analysis of human life became parsed out into discrete disciplines, and philosophy became separated from economics. Since that time, Western philosophers have tended to study moral meanings and systems of thought, but not how these esoteric values get exercised in the course of everyday economic life. For their part, Western economists have focused on the workings and outcomes of market systems—how things get produced, distributed, and exchanged, as well as the effects of regulation and deregulation on these processes. Rarely have they considered whether and how moral meanings may be implicated in economic choices, much less how these meanings are significant or how they might derive from influences beyond individual tastes and preferences.3

Anthropologists are in a privileged position to document the local upheavals or continuities in moral systems of meaning once capitalist influences appear in indigenous societies, and some have done so.4 However, a variety of factors may have discouraged anthropological scholarship focused
on these issues. To begin with, there are no models to react to in disciplines like economics and philosophy. Second, anthropologists tend to work with economic data or with cognitive data, but not often both. Third, we often hold romantic attachments to gift-based societies where systems of reciprocity are seen to contribute to a more humane “moral economy.” And finally, related to these attachments, many scholars hold convictions about the morally vacuous nature of capitalism. For a combination of reasons, anthropologists have a long way to go to mine the relationship of morality and economics across societies in a systematic way.

Economics and Morality brings together the work of scholars concerned to respond to this research lacuna and to the morally charged moment of our consumption-oriented, rapidly globalizing and unsustainable world. Because the moral challenges in a given capitalist society can no longer be effectively addressed without considering the interaction and influences of different societies in the global system, ethnographic research from around the world can help document and make sense of the changes sweeping our planet. Our contributors are American, Norwegian, Canadian, British, and Swedish. The data for the work presented here draws on their fieldwork from a broad range of societies, including Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Norway, Madagascar, Guatemala, Trinidad, South Africa, North America, and Kenya.

ORGANIZATION

The questions behind contributors’ studies are wide ranging. These concerns fall naturally into three primary areas that organize the volume.

Part 1 of Economics and Morality focuses on the challenges and adaptations related to the movement of capitalism into societies that have, until recently, remained outside the reach of Western economic logic and exchange. The chapters by Robbins, Walsh, and Little bring ethnographic research to bear on the way in which moral norms embedded in a given system are thrown into sharp relief through the economic interactions across systems with profoundly different histories.

Part 2 shifts the focus to market economies and how moral conflict and struggle in the economic realm variously operate. Multiple, coexisting moralities provide the source of this conflict and, in some cases, lead to new adaptations. The chapters by Halperin, Prentice, Werner, and Dolan speak to these themes.

Part 3 of the volume offers top-down ethnographic research that conveys the moral assertions and practices emerging in many societies among corporations and state governments. Such movements promote identifiable standards of economic behavior regarded as “ethical” as discussed in chapters by Garsten and Herms, Rajak, and Pitluck.

Before discussing in more depth the ideas grounding each section of the volume, it is useful to back up and consider a question that is so basic it is commonly neglected: is morality an inherent part of all economies or only some? I make the argument here that, in fact, all economies possess a moral center. The path toward this conclusion begins with anthropological work in non-Western societies and ends in neoliberal economies where it is most difficult for many to detect how morality is functioning. Understanding how much and what kinds of moral norms are built into an economy will clarify how some kinds of efforts to increase moral accountability in the economy get traction while others do not.

FINDING THE RELEVANCE OF MORALITY TO ECONOMIES

Studies of non-Western societies are a good place to begin a search for the systematic interweaving of morality with economic life. In the late 1800s, after the field of sociology had been established, French scholars Emile Durkheim and his nephew, Marcel Mauss, offered early models for the social glue of small-scale, non-Western societies. Their studies foreshadow the importance of these societies to the understanding of those based on advanced capitalism. Durkheim proposed that “primitive” societies hold together because members share a great deal in common, especially the kinds of work needed to survive. These commonalities foster a collective consciousness reinforced by social norms that regulate conformity and serve as the basis of social solidarity. Thirty years later, Mauss drew on ethnographic research from various societies to develop his influential ideas about how gifts are the currency exchanged between members of such societies. That is, gifts fulfill a society’s social and economic needs. In his seminal essay, The Gift (1990 [1925]), Mauss argued that when someone gives yams, shell bracelets, or some other resource to another person, it is not merely the thing that is given, but also a part of the giver’s spirit. Because such gifts are “inalienable” (inseparable from the giver) they compel people to both accept them and, in turn, give back something vested with their own spirit. Building on his uncle’s work, Mauss claimed that the entire system of self-provisioning is built on social relationships of “moral persons who carry on exchanges” (Parry 1986: 456), binding them to each other and, thus, to the good of the group. These models have since inspired the work of generations of sociologists and anthropologists and established a baseline definition for economic morality.

Mauss developed his ideas in part by using findings from Bronislaw Malinowski’s long-term fieldwork with the Trobriand Islanders near Papua New Guinea (1961 [1922]). There, Malinowski studied the curious inter-island trade known as the kula ring, in which men traded shell armbands
and necklaces in prestigious, ritual voyages to other islands. What struck Malinowski was that the economic behavior of Trobrianders could not be described in terms that neoclassical economists had suggested motivated human beings everywhere: material self-interest. Instead, he argued, islanders were motivated to exchange shell jewelry for all kinds of social reasons, from traditional duties to beliefs in magic, to potential for prestige. The work of Malinowski, Mauss, Durkheim, and others inspired economic historian, Karl Polanyi (1957). Polanyi used anthropological insights as he considered how different kinds of societies organize their economies: by reciprocity, as in the small-scale societies Mauss had described; by redistribution, as in chieftdoms and tributary systems; or by market exchange, as in capitalism. One of these systems dominates every society, Polanyi said, so it makes no sense to use the tools of Western economic science to describe nonmarket societies. The associated assumptions about rational individuals making economic choices based on self-interest and personal gain simply do not apply in these contexts, he said, echoing the claims of Malinowski (Wilk and Cliggett 2007: 8).

By the 1960s, anthropologists had accumulated fieldwork experience in a broad range of societies. Many, who had also found that social life was deeply embedded in economic acts, came to wage an intellectual battle with neoclassical "formalists" over this idea. These "substantivist" anthropologists, like Bohannon and Dalton (1965), used the ideas of Polanyi to contest the claims of formalists. Not all humans were motivated by self-interest, they argued, and thus the market model could not be applied universally. Scott Cook's classic denunciation helped formalists strike back. Substantivists, he argued, were just "romanticists" who harbored an "anti-market" ideology and were guilty of "gross oversimplification of the history of Western economic thought" (1966: 336).8

The intellectual legacies of twentieth-century anthropology thus fostered a strong anthropological conviction about the inseparability of social norms and economic life in precapitalist societies. The work of E. P. Thompson carried this pattern of thinking to a new moral frontier by applying the idea of a "moral economy" to a peasant context. In 1971, Thompson published work that drew on Mauss's argument about the implicit obligations in gift-based economies to explain the conflict when different economic logics are at work in the same society. Thompson noted that in eighteenth-century England, peasants' expectations of food security were violated by market sellers. These vendors were selling bread at higher prices than normal to make up for grain shortages, leaving a basic staple unaffordable for many. The outrage of peasants and the working class led to massive riots. Thompson explained that there had been an unwritten "moral economy" that acted as a normative contract between peasants and landlords, one that peasants trusted they could count on. To peasants, the price hikes on grain constituted an immoral breach of an understood contract.8 James C. Scott (1976) drew similar conclusions to Thompson's to describe the peasant struggles against the state in Southeast Asia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scott asserted that peasants had organized themselves in rational ways to share resources through reciprocity. The "risk-averse" moral economy that characterized these peasants, said Scott, involved their "safety first" orientation to food security and to concern for protecting control over their lives in the face of colonialism (1976: 4–5).

It may be relevant to note as well that Mauss's work detailing the social logic of gift-based societies was in large measure inspired by his own anticapitalist convictions and socialist political activism (Hart 2007). Thus, even though Mauss rejected the idea that "primitive" societies were built on altruism, perhaps it is no surprise that anthropologists have leveraged his work along with Polanyi's and others in this vein to suggest evidence of the inherent moral value and social complexity of such societies. With both Scott and Thompson's description of subsistence-based peasant systems as "moral economies," the rhetorical inference of moral superiority was reinforced. Morality in economics for some has thus become synonymous with the particular set of principles inscribed in reciprocity-based, noncapitalist societies. In this view, the advent of capitalism caused a rupture that pushed treasured moral norms to the sidelines and stripped the economy of its true moral foundation. The most trenchant critiques of capitalism point to its betrayal of these moral values, values that had once bound groups of people to each other and to the common good (Hart 2005; Wilk and Cliggett 2007: 160).9

The subtle and sometimes not so subtle binary idea of moral, precapitalist societies and amoral or immoral capitalist societies draws on anthropological insights about the historical shifts that accompany profound economic transformations, that is, from concern for the social good to a concern for individual choices. Enlightenment commitments to rationality, progress, and private property all shaped the logic of capitalism, but the premise of the free market system is grounded on a concept of individuals as autonomous actors, deciding for themselves what is best. Anthropologists and social theorists compare the wants, desires, choices, and identities of individuals who become the source of meaning in market economies to the interdependence of social actors and socially led motivations in precapitalist societies. The result is a nostalgia-based critique of capitalist economies that are seen to have no moral center. But as Foucault warned, "There is in this hatred of the present or the immediate past a dangerous tendency to invoke a completely mythical past" (1993: 165).

Anthropological depictions of the individualistic, economic, and amoral behaviors fostered by market economies also owe much to the work
of Max Weber. Following his visit to the United States in 1904, Weber wrote his seminal argument about how a new Protestant ethic spurred the rise of capitalist society (1922 [1930]). Since Calvinists and Puritans believed in predestination, they needed a sign of God’s grace in order to identify those who would be chosen for salvation. In the context of early American society, Weber said that “sign” came to be reflected in an individual's economic success. The conviction that material wealth signaled an individual's selection for salvation thus became folded into a distinctly Protestant cultural attitude spurring a fierce work ethic. Moreover, because it was considered unseemly to show off one’s wealth, members of these religious groups effectively “hid” their accumulations by investing in their own enterprises. As Weber indicates, investing in this way had the amazing, “unintended consequence” of creating new forms of capital that spurred the development of capitalism itself! Ultimately, investing one’s earnings made possible an unapologetic goal of wealth accumulation.

Weber’s story of the moral shift that permitted the rise of capitalism is only one of many accounts. Albert Hirschman, economic historian, proposes an alternative view in The Passions and the Interests (1997 [1977]). According to Hirschman, European political philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century believed that the expanding role of commerce and industry offered hope as a harmless distraction from dangerous human “passions,” such as ambition and the lust for power and sex. Reason was not strong enough to rein in such passions, but relatively “innocuous” passions such as greed and avarice (known as “interests”) could be used to “tame” the more destructive passions. Hirschman argues that the political encouragement to act on one’s “interests” was seen to save European society from its base human nature. It was in this context, he states, that moral philosopher Adam Smith interpreted self-interest in economic terms. By the late 1700s, a bourgeois ethos of accumulation had developed and economic self-interest had become firm ground for the defense of a capitalist economy.

Mauss too weighed in on the moral transitions required of capitalist economies. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he said, it became increasingly common “to hold that the self springs from individual consciousness as an irreducible being” and that the result of this was that “the only valid source of motivation was the individual” rather than a self identified in terms of social relationships (Carrier 1997: 138). With the shifts in land tenure and the commodification of labor associated with capitalism, changes in the autonomy of the individual impacted understandings about social obligations and what represented the “moral good” (Carrier 1997: 139).

Each of these views emphasizes the extraordinary shifts required in moral consciousness that accompanied the rise of capitalist logic, but it is Weber’s account that continues to dominate the imagination of anthropologists and sociologists about the moral origins of market economies. Sociologist Ronald Glassman, for example, holds that in the transition from a logic of self-provisioning to a logic of competition for wealth, capitalism in Protestant societies was never intended to serve the interests of morality, at least not the moral concerns of social groups (2000: 195–96). Mark Banks adds that a capitalist society “only provides a new kind of individuated tyranny in which economic relations continue to devolve into increasingly amoral and immoral territory” (2006: 56). Because noncapitalist societies are our frame of reference for what morality looks like in an economy, it is no wonder that many see capitalism as the road to moral ruin. Recent scholarship has begun to crack some of these long-held assumptions by documenting a degree of fluidity between market and nonmarket systems, and gift and commodity exchange, as we will see. Yet oppositional portrayals persist.

As anthropologists with at least a generation of practice at exploding false dichotomies, we are surprisingly complicit in our binary regard of morality in the economy. Perhaps this implicit polarization occurs because our personal moral commitments are at stake, commitments that may run deeper than our professional identities. If we do not see moral principles we believe enbraced by the economic system we are part of, it is hard to know how morality plays a role. Moreover, in our professional lives as fieldworkers, many of us witness the worst of capitalist sprawl. We see firsthand how free-market products and media increasingly capture and then betray the hopes of remote indigenous peoples, as new ideologies about individualism, competition, and Christian salvation undermine long-standing kinship relations, systems of reciprocity, and beliefs about the supernatural. Can it be prudent to argue that market economies have a discernible morality?

While the views of anthropologists and sociologists on these questions often reflect dichotomous thinking, economists are likely to deflect the question of morality in the economy altogether. Among mainstream economists today, the starting point for analyzing capitalist economies is a utilitarian model of economic behavior known as “preference theory” or “rational choice theory.” The model assumes that people make choices based on what will best serve their individual interests. Until recently, most economists still argued that material self-interest was the utility that rational individuals sought. Today, many recognize that individual choices can maximize anything—status, reputation, opportunities for children, feelings of altruism. Yet because the model collapses every economic choice down to a function of the utility that choice serves, moral influences are of little matter to most economists.

In stark contrast to both the economic models that ignore the role of morality and the nostalgia-based critiques of capitalism that decry the loss of the moral, social good, there are ideological advocates of market systems who argue that the moral good is fully woven into the fabric of capitalism.
Western conceptualizations of the market system as it was emerging in eighteenth-century Europe have profoundly shaped these ideas. Foremost among these early intellectuals was Adam Smith (1723–1790), whose seminal work, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776 [1776]), became the rootstock of “classical” economic science. Smith argued that when markets are unimpeded by government controls, individuals act in their own self-interest, and ultimately serve the good of the society at large (note the slant that Hirschman’s thesis provides on this idea). According to Smith, the “invisible hand” of the market efficiently induces competition, which in turn keeps prices low and monopolies out. The “greater good” made possible by unfettered markets is compromised, he said, when controls (wrought by a “visible hand”) are imposed on the freedom of the market. However, it is worth remembering that the context of European political economics during Smith’s era were strongly interventionist, hardly resembling the neoliberal incarnation of contemporary Anglo-Saxon economic systems (Wilk and Cliggett 2007: 53).

A hundred years after Smith, the details of a “neo” classical economic model emerged, clarifying both the market mechanisms of supply and demand, as well as the central assumptions that individuals make rational choices to maximize their utility based on their knowledge of the relevant choices. Alfred Marshall’s *Principles of Economics* (1948 [1890]) articulated a foundation of the theory that became known as neoclassical economics. Since then, new textbooks have modified certain portions of the model, but the overarching principles of minimal government interference, free markets, and the invisible hand have remained central tenants of the contemporary neoclassical credo.

Since the early 1990s, a number of scholars have published fresh considerations of Smith’s work, eager to point out some of his neglected ideas in contrast to those that came to dominate modern readings of his work. Many of these analyses point to Smith’s prior work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1776 [1759]), as a testament to the moral framework that Smith had assumed would characterize “self-interest” in capitalist exchanges. Perhaps the reinterpretations of Smith correspond to an increasing urgency among market proponents and academic scholars to locate new moral insights from an intellectual ancestor who can speak to the concerns of extreme neoliberal expansion, uneasy market abuses and betrayals of public trust.13

Advocates of laissez-faire markets continue to regard capitalism as the ultimate moral achievement of our human history. These supporters of a “liberal” economy—that is, markets that are free from government interference, not to be confused with left-wing political sensibilities in the United States today—argue that capitalism is the only system to uphold the freedom of the individual. Individuals are freed from systems that allow little space for autonomy or individual empowerment, from tyrannical governments, oppressive feudal systems, or morally corrupt alternatives of socialism (Cagnier 1997: 446). The very fact that individuals have choices like never before is seen to constitute a “moral good” (Carrier 1997: 3).

In other words, the freedom granted individuals in a capitalist society carries its own kind of morality. Heterodox economists Hausman and McPherson elaborate on this understanding by explaining the values that inhere in “neo” liberal thought, politically closest to libertarian philosophy (2006: 168). The overall emphasis of neoliberal policy is on freeing the movement of goods, services, and capital by dismantling restrictions on investments and capital flows, shrinking the size of the public sector, deregulating markets, lifting the burden of too many taxes from individuals and businesses, and giving room to market forces to work out the costs and benefits of everyday life. Neoliberal philosophy is explicit in stating that the central moral force of a just society revolves around individual property rights—including the rights of individuals to pass on property to whomever they choose—and to legal protection of these rights.15 These ideas about “rights and liberties” intrinsic to capitalist systems are naturalized, in part, because they appear to derive seamlessly from the larger evolution of moral and political democratization in Europe and the United States (2006: 172).

Ultimately, what separates the market-as-morality fundamentalists from the nostalgia-based critics who see no morality in the market can be usefully rendered in terms of a contemporary debate in political philosophy. Modern political theory suggests that liberal market advocates tend to emphasize “negative” kinds of morality, that is, the right to be free from interference and the moral duty not to interfere with the rights of others. In other words, the force of moral commitments in neoliberal models of capitalism is tied strictly to the rights of individuals to remain free from control except when the rights of others have been jeopardized (Christman 2005). Some taxes are required to support legitimate, state-level activities such as national defense, police, and the courts, but, in theory, there are few positive moral requirements demanded by a neoliberal market system. Thus there are no rights to basic welfare, such as state-provisioning of food or shelter or health care for the poor.16 From this vantage point, the “right to life is a right not to be killed, not a right to be given subsistence” (Hausman and McPherson 2006: 169). Not all capitalist systems are neoliberal, however, and we will return to this variation later.

Thus, in the search for an answer to whether moral commitments organize some part of all economic systems, we encounter an interesting set of narratives. Among many anthropologists and sociologists, “moral” economies are those organized around reciprocal exchange because social obligations bind people to each other and support the needs of communities. From this perspective, societies organized around commodity exchange
excessively indulge the individual's self-interest, undermining social values that benefit all.

Pro-market advocates, on the other hand, rehearse a different narrative. Capitalist economies represent a moral breakthrough for individual freedom, an Enlightenment-led release from overdetermined and oppressive precapitalist regimes. Both groups are steeped in their own romanticized depictions; however, the claims of both also point to partial truths about the moral dimensions of different kinds of economies, even if the emphasis of those dimensions can be debated. A third group, representing mainstream neoclassical economists, has taken morality off the table altogether by funnelling all curiosity about culture and economy into a science-framed narrative of utility and maximization.

We will take up the implications of these arguments in the sections to come, premised on the idea that all economies—not merely pre- or noncapitalist ones—are moral economies. The authors in this volume offer groundbreaking, ethnographic testimony of this argument. It is to their work we turn next.

PART 1: THE STAKES OF MORALITY, RECIPROCITY, AND CHANGE

In part 1 of Economics and Morality, each author presents a case study that advances our theoretical and ethnographic understanding of gift-based societies in transition. Until recently, few scholars have attempted to probe the theoretical limits of the applicability of Mauss's argument. Chapters by Robbins, Walsh, and Little (part 1), as well as those by Halperin (part 2) and Rajak (part 3), all contribute to a reconsideration of Maussian ideas and assert in different ways how the intersection of market and gift economies is often a seamless one.

This work comes at a good time. For although Mauss's theory of the gift and the reciprocity it obligates has provided anthropologists with critical tools to think with and to teach with, it has also contributed to misinterpretations of smaller scale, noncapitalist societies as static and morally superior (Booth 1994: 658). The inevitable contrast with capitalist societies leads many to demonize those economies based on commodities that are impersonal and driven by self-interest and material gain. These ideas have been reinscribed by a long line of major social theorists, including Marx, Weber, Hoitkheimer and Adorno, Bourdieu, Bauman, Giddens, Beck, and Putnam, all of whom have pointed in varying degrees to the loss of morality and conscience and the collapse of the social bond of community in economies built on capitalism.

However detailed and nuanced and partially true these depictions may be, they have fostered an anthropological skepticism about morality in capital-
Chapters in part 1 build on these insights and expose further complexities in the terrain of morality and economics. The authors here draw on data from non-Western societies that, to different degrees, are becoming integrated with outside market economies. The presence of such “outside” influences from the West thrusts the moral premises of the “insider” system into sharp relief. It is in this space of vulnerability where the local moralities vested in routine economic expectations become clearly tested. As in the encounters of strangers, the crossroads that link people coming from different directions present more danger, but also more opportunity, than travels along a single road. Some groups ignore the hazards of such encounters and explicitly assert their faith in the moral continuity of the inside system. Andrew Walsh’s study about the Malagasy (chapter 2) speaks eloquently to the surprises and costs of such choices. Similarly, Joel Robbins points out how a local act of generosity leaves no trace on the outsider who did not recognize his violation of a morally binding “insider” expectation (chapter 1). The cost to the Uranmin of Papua New Guinea was their time, but more importantly as in Walsh’s case, the real cost was to their faith in a shared moral order. Like Laura Bohannan’s “Shakespeare in the Bush,” (1966) the common presumption that mutually intelligible moral codes guide economic life and transcend people with vastly different histories only reveals the ethnocentrism of everyone who believed it so. The cautionary tale reminds us that the validity of a single set of moral principles as one travels across different social contexts may well lead to confusion, disappointment, or other unintended consequences!

If we recognize that every economic system draws on its own moral resources, we can begin to locate the moral logic that animates various economic choices. As this first set of papers demonstrates, when people participate in different economic systems at the same time, when profound economic change is occurring, there are unusual opportunities to glimpse how those moral convictions that are anchored to economic habits get drawn into question. This line of anthropological inquiry exposes some of the deepest difficulties associated with change.

Robbins applies his understanding of a Papua New Guinea people to propose an innovative, emotion-centered bridge to link the logics of gift and commodity systems. Robbins’s research draws on many years of fieldwork with the Uranmin. What if, he asks, Western economists have altogether missed a critical factor that underlies capitalist logic? What if, in analyzing the motivational content of gift exchange in precapitalist societies, we discover a force that is socially defined yet intimately individual? Robbins argues that exchanges carry emotional weight and that anthropologists and economists, concerned with the thing exchanged and the system it is built upon more than the underlying motivation, have neglected the force of this emotional reality. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni and a number of heterodox economists have criticized the neoclassical model of capitalism for subsuming all motivations under a single aggregate concept of ”preferences,” thus denying any influence from moral commitments (Etzioni 1988; Hausman and McPherson 2006). Robbins suggests that if we understand that the morally binding motivation in any exchange, noncapitalist or capitalist, is powered by the need for mutual recognition, then we can begin to see new potential connections between gift and commodity economies in ways that challenge assumptions about their analytically discrete nature. By linking the two types of economies with such a theoretical bridge, we have a fresh way to jostle static depictions and move the discussion forward.

Another kind of fluidity connects societies dominated by practices of gift exchange and those dominated by commodity exchange: the search for self-gain. In many noncapitalist societies, Weber argued, the search for personal gain is not morally constrained so long as any advantages to oneself originate outside the functioning unit of kin or community (Rosebury 1997: 255). Walter Little’s work with indigenous Maya (chapter 3) presents ethnographic witness to this pattern. We learn how encounters with outsiders may present benefits for insiders who are positioned to leverage their mysterious powers and benefit from new economic opportunities, all the while avoiding disruption to the moral universe of the local society. Little explains that traditional Maya healers have become sought after for their insights and healing power by individuals from the United States and Europe. These new, prosperous Western clients can be morally accommodated by the norms of the inside system because the system has no taboos forbidding cash gifts taken from outside one’s own community.

Another way of realizing the difficulty of walling off gifts from commodity societies is by seeing how people may slip imperceptibly from one group into another. Andrew Walsh discusses his research with a local community in Malagasy where the sudden rise of outside trade in sapphires has blurred the understanding of who is who and what rules of reciprocity apply. The profitable trade of gems implicates some, but not all, insiders and complicates Thompson’s juxtaposition of clearly discernable groups—the moral economy of peasants versus the profit orientation of shopkeepers. Walsh’s case clarifies the latitude that is always available in the context of moral behavior. By pointing out how habits of exchange may get interrupted or go wrong in the context of change, he exposes the underbelly of Mauss’s notion of gift-based societies. The Maussian idea that obligations compel an individual to give, receive, and reciprocate, Walsh argues, must be understood as only “potential” obligations. In effect, the choices one makes can reproduce the system or challenge its relevance. Walsh shows how individual agency exposes the limits of the structure of exchange in a context of change. Like Robbins who looks at gift-giving systems as templates that can
be challenged, shifted, or ignored, Walsh’s insights reveal how new choices bearing moral weight expose the ragged, uncharted interaction of capitalist and indigenous logics of exchange.

The moral latitude that inheres in any ethic of exchange can thus clarify the adaptability of certain choices in the context of change. Little’s work also demonstrates how people can negotiate between the structure of exchange (that imposes limits inside the system) and the freedom of agency (to negotiate different terms outside this community structure). Clearly, depictions of the gift economies as “moral” and the market economies as “immoral” block the kind of insights that might help us grasp our complex moral and economic worlds.

PART 2: MORAL AGENCY INSIDE MARKET LOGIC

Recognizing that precapitalist systems built around reciprocity and capitalist systems built around commodities are less discrete than we might have imagined can help us think about how morality fits into capitalism. As anthropologists trained to step inside the logic of other systems and analyze them from within, taking the view from the inside should not be so hard. Yet very few have attempted to work out an emic comprehension of the system to which we ourselves belong. One notable exception is the work of James Carrier and his contributors in the 1997 volume, The Meaning of the Market: The Free Market in Western Culture. Carrier points out that too often we do not distinguish between the neoclassical model of the economy and the economy itself. Thus, he argues, assumptions that underlie economic theory have led many to assume that capitalism necessarily involves impersonal exchanges made by autonomous individuals based on their rational choices among the known universe of alternatives. The problem, Carrier says, is that such assumptions do not in fact describe what actually takes place in a market economy. Instead, firms develop personal ties with other firms, employees with each other, and practices of gift giving and network building routinely create certain obligations among and across individuals and firms alike. In fact, one might argue, only a system with some degree of porosity would allow ordinary individuals to push their own agendas and sometimes effect an integration of moral positions into the functioning of a market economy.

Before we consider the case studies that explore moral claims of ordinary people in part 2 of the volume, we need to identify the nature of morality that operates in the system itself. Just how is capitalism a moral system? And if morality is indeed a constituent part of a capitalist system, how do we explain the fact that market forces have led to massive deforestation, global warming, pharmaceutical dumping, illegal trade in human beings, organs, and endangered animal parts? What morality constrains those companies that rush to export production to countries with the cheapest labor and weakest environmental laws? The easiest solution is to regard the system as simply amoral, maybe even immoral.

Earlier we considered how different theorists have explained the moral transformations leading to the embrace of the autonomous self and self-interest that accompanied the rise of capitalism. These transitions establish the context for how morality operates in capitalist economies. Before the rise of capitalism, the church represented the primary institutional force regulating moral behavior. The material changes that fostered capitalist exchange led to the commodification of land, labor, tools, and machinery, and for this reason, the need to protect one’s property emerged. Protecting property in turn created a new form of contract that bound the parties involved to legal enforcement of property rights. Thus, with the rise of capitalist economic arrangements, the moral concerns of the economy became located in the state and in laws of the state designed to enforce the new, moral rights of ownership.

At this point in our discussion, it is useful to consider how an image may help us think about the complexity and variations in moral understandings that arise in different kinds of economies. I propose it advisedly, for heuristic value. If we were to imagine a sphere indicating the space that moral expectations occupy in the exchanges between people in reciprocity-based societies, we might well imagine one large enough to encompass the entire society—exchanges enforce that wholeness and solidarity of the system. But as Durkheim made clear, such societies demand a group consciousness in which all members comply with a single set of norms. When any piece of such a system is injured or made vulnerable by violations of these norms, the entire moral order of society is threatened. By contrast, the moral force of exchange in capitalist societies occupies much less real estate relative to the society at large. Here, we might more appropriately imagine the morality of the economy as a small sphere inside a much larger one. Two key points clarify the meaning of a moral sphere in capitalist societies: (1) it is clearly interior to the larger social context, and (2) the sphere’s relative size and contents reflect not the degree to which the economy is moral but rather the degree to which certain mandates (as expressed in law or custom) organize the moral concerns of the economy. In capitalist societies generally, market economies make fewer moral demands on economic actors than precapitalist economies, where all economic exchange carries a moral mandate. Yet because moral behavior in capitalist societies results not only from the mandates of a moral sphere, but also from the voluntary initiatives of individuals and firms, the ultimate “morality” of a capitalist economy cannot be presumed.
In a capitalist society, the constituent parts of a moral sphere include assumptions about the economic rights of individuals: to own property, to accumulate wealth, to create firms, to buy and sell with little encumbrance. Some of these rights, such as the protection of one’s property, are codified in law; others rise only to the level of common expectation based on customary practice. However, the fact that these rights carry the power of law or customary practice does not necessarily mean they are shared ideas. In fact, the constituent elements of a moral sphere vary over time and across capitalist societies and, as we will explore, are as likely as not to be contested.

The moral spheres of capitalist societies are neither static nor hard edged. They are instead elastic and permeable—capable of change in size and content. In a system that is not bound by group dictates, individuals have a great deal of autonomy. Irrespective of the socioeconomic inequalities or social norms that constrain the autonomy of some much more than others, the fact remains that there are far more choices than exist in other kinds of systems. All this latitude creates a lot of variability in what people choose to do, possess, and believe, differences that reinforce the system’s need for adaptability to survive, a capacity for accommodation and change that Marx neither witnessed nor predicted would occur. This same variability is also the source for the many points of view about what constitutes morality in an economic realm.

With its nonencompassing moral sphere, a capitalist system generally makes no attempt to accommodate concerns about moral economic activity that lie outside the sphere unless these concerns either threaten to undermine an enterprise or present an opportunity to profit by integrating the concern. So, for example, when public pressure to clean up the environment leads to legislative proposals to regulate polluting industries, those industries complain and attempt to leverage the moral center of capitalism—arguing that controls on the free market reduce their ability to compete and thus survive. But if public pressure is great enough, the legislation will pass, forcing the permeable moral sphere of capitalism to expand to accommodate a larger set of moral concerns than it did before. Similarly, when there is profit potential in responding to public sensibilities about moral concerns, this incentive, too, may act to enlarge the moral sphere.

Many companies today, for example, are finding ways to capitalize on the growing public concern about global warming, unsustainable consumption, and inhumane labor practices. Hotels market their competitive “ethical” edge by promoting earth-friendly laundering and recycling. Beer companies market their all-sustainable production facilities, restaurants develop menus according to what is available from local, sustainable farms, and clothing manufacturers offer “sweatshop-free” labor guarantees. Modern churches are also attempting to promote moral behavior as good for busi-
poverty would, in this view, impose unfair and undue tax burdens on those with more income (itself a form of property). Thus, neoliberal versions of capitalist models theoretically embrace few of the "positive" types of morality that characterize reciprocity-based societies. There are no built-in moral mandates to foster or sustain communities; to nurture social bonds; to protect the quality of air, water, or land; to help the poor; develop the arts; or support quality education—mandates that do exist to varying degrees in other kinds of capitalist systems. The point is not that liberal market advocates do not see some problems with the distribution of rewards in a capitalist system. Many do. They simply do not believe that there is any alternative system that is more equitable or more just. For them, the weight of a high tax burden to support these goals, however virtuous, is too steep a moral trade off when one considers the lost entrepreneurial energy and workforce productivity at stake (Berliner 1999: 294).

We all know many exceptions to the characterization of capitalist relations as lacking soul or heart because, as Carrier cautions us, the neoclassical model and the actual economy are not the same thing. Without nudging from government and without direct pressure, some businesses will take it upon themselves to do more to uphold certain moral norms than what is required by the moral sphere of the system. However, these exceptions are not reliable and, thus, raise the value of identifying more systematic routes for expanding the moral accountability of the market.

How then does a moral sphere extend its influence? As was true for strategies to contract the scope of the sphere, there are several ways: (1) regulation at any level of government can force the market to accommodate a moral norm in the larger society—assuring safety in workplaces, protecting endangered wildlife, or prohibiting the use of lead in products and toxins in rivers; (2) businesses can voluntarily adopt standards that are effectively enforced through the power of reputation (as with the beverage industry's decision in 2006 to withdraw full-calorie sodas from vending machines in schools30); and (3) activist volunteer organizations and nonprofit groups can attempt to promote their values and thereby apply direct pressure to firms and industries to adapt (as with "morality-driven," religion-based business alliances, organizations that sell offsets to carbon footprints, and watchdog groups for income inequality).31

In part 2 of the volume, we present four cases involving market and nonmarket activities that operate at the individual and community level, activities of ordinary people who make claims about what is economically moral. These cases can help us think about what kinds of pressures permeate the moral sphere, pressing it to expand, and what kinds do not achieve that degree of influence.

Catherine Dolan (chapter 7) focuses on the increasing cachet of moral consumption among British consumers eager to feel that they are contribut-
skill. These cultural phenomena, in which some people systematically perform economic acts that they regard as moral despite their illegality, are certainly not limited to the Caribbean (Milgram 2008).

Different kinds of grassroots efforts to put pressure on the moral sphere occur when nonprofit or volunteer-based groups attempt to compensate for the inadequacy of capitalist markets to supply “public goods.” Rhoda Halperin’s case of “extreme giftgiving” in Cincinnati presents an excellent example of the heroic grassroots effort required to make a charter school work (chapter 4). Within market economies, argues Halperin, hidden or unrecognized “moral” economies may also thrive. Ultimately, she points out, Mauss’s idea of the gift economy must be reformulated to accommodate gift-based microeconomies that emerge in the context of neoliberal capitalism. Halperin suggests that sustaining a vital and personal ethic of exchange among community members effectively rewrites the logic of impersonal, commodified exchange at a time when survival itself is at stake. “Doing what it takes” is code for “making choices that go outside normal economic relations,” giving individuals the implicit moral authority to pursue creative economic acts in order to help save the group. At the same time, however, these economic activities that benefit the community rather than the self do not lie entirely outside the realm of the market economy; to some degree, in fact, they depend on it. Like Walsh and Little, Halperin thus shows how gift and commodity economies are bound up together. Her chapter also clarifies how morally led economic claims and activities that operate outside the moral sphere are at a disadvantage in gaining ground within it. Without the pressure produced from greater numbers of people, or the opportunities for market players to somehow profit from the moral commitment of gifters to keep their school alive, the needs of the school will continue to require heroic volunteer efforts like extreme giftgiving.

The moral quandary of negotiating whose morality matters is at the center of Cynthia Werner’s work (chapter 6) on radioactive waste disposal in Texas. In this instance, Werner recounts how members of a small West Texas community attempt to press their rights with regulatory agencies to have a private company bury the waste near their town. The moral position they take is unusual, but by arguing that they should be permitted to decide for themselves whether the waste site should be allowed near their community, the townspeople are clearly relying on energy from the moral sphere of capitalism: the logic of freedom of choice and unfettered markets. Werner’s own role as a consultant with the state regulatory agency that reviews license applications for waste disposal positions her to understand the stakes of all parties involved and to collect detailed ethnographic data from multiple perspectives. As an insider, she had access to the variety of moral views held: the company wanting the right to pursue a dump site with a willing town; the town residents and leaders who want the freedom to contract with the company without interference; the environmental activist groups who object to the lack of moral accountability by the company; and the state authorities who want to control the process.

Werner points out that because residents are strongly concerned about the viability of their town’s future, what they believe about the small risks associated with waste disposal are well worth the economic benefits they would most certainly accrue. She points out that some in the town have worked to frame the choice as a patriotic one while outsiders like the Sierra Club voice strong opposition to the prospect, also on moral grounds. The case demonstrates how a grassroots effort can reinscribe the legitimacy of the moral sphere and, at the same time, demonstrate that what is regarded as moral or immoral economically varies in relation to where one is situated in the system. Unlike the case of fair trade, the costs of the moral position of townspeople seem potentially high, yet given the alternatives of a town that has no basis for survival, the risks are perceived as relatively small.

Many would argue that in the United States and in Britain, where neoliberal policies have their greatest foothold, there are serious problems with significant and growing income inequalities, among them the fact that tens of millions of people live without health insurance and millions are homeless. The world looks at post-Katrina New Orleans and wonders how the richest nation on earth could tolerate the chronic suffering of hundreds of thousands of American citizens. These unseemly realities might appear to call into question the moral character of the economic system. And yet, with a system that recognizes few “positive” types of moral claims, accountability for these problems would take a legal breach in which someone could be found guilty and assigned blame. But has any company or group of people actively violated the law or even the principles of the market? As Milton Friedman argued, the corporation is not like an individual (1990 [1970]). There is no “person” to hold accountable when gross inequities occur, precisely the problem that Ulrich Beck notes about the character of global capitalism today (Beck and Cronin 2005). Classman too recognizes this problem, noting that “the market system has no mechanism within its own rules for dealing with or caring for the less fortunate” (2000: 198). Economist Duncan Foley echoes this view, arguing that “we cannot depend on the spread of capitalism by itself to solve the problems of poverty and inequality. Capital accumulation will increase material wealth, but will distribute it unevenly” (Foley 2006: 224).

If a moral cause extends beyond the fundamental promises and mandates of the moral sphere of an economic system, there is necessarily a struggle between those who do not believe its influence should expand and those who believe it must. But it is also the case that the very nature of capitalism requires it to be flexible and adapt to market forces. When
individuals, firms, or the state itself applies adequate pressure, the sphere can and will grow or contract accordingly.

PART 3: FRONTIERS OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Doing good can come with a cost, even if there are obvious benefits to oneself or one's group or company. The cost of making a moral choice can be especially high when there is wide latitude to make different choices. When choice is directed, by contrast, either by group norms or legal regulations, the costs of moral action are, in a sense, neutralized because they are shared by all. When we are free to choose between different options and it costs no more to make a moral economic choice, most of us will likely opt for that choice. But it is almost invariably more expensive to produce a commodity using well-paid, well-treated employees than to produce that same commodity using techniques that simply ensure the lowest cost and most efficient way to profit. The point is that to appreciate the patterned ways in which moral principles are most likely to get absorbed into the moral sphere of capitalist economies, we need to consider the costs as well as benefits of doing something we believe is the right thing.

In the two previous sections of this introduction, we encountered some examples in which the "cost" of what is seen to be a moral good is high. Walsh's chapter details how local villagers in Madagascar stood to lose their stock of sapphires to strangers if they acted with moral assumptions that were out of sync with the changing economic realities. Halperin's chapter about the Cincinnati charter school offers another example of the high cost of moral choices when "doing what it takes" requires immense energy and resource contributions of school staff and parents just to keep the school alive and functioning in the context of an underfunded school system. Generally, in cases like these where a moral choice comes at a high price, either the choice is unsustainable in the long run or those making such choices simply continue to pay the cost. For the cost to come down, many more people will have to decide to make the same moral choice.

On the other hand, there are some moral choices that cost relatively little. Dolan's example of fair-trade flower consumption offers a good example of the slight premium required to buy the satisfaction of a moral conscience.34 When it does not cost too much to make an economic choice that seems morally good, the choice resonates easily with the economic rationality of capitalism. Those moral actions that seem to make good economic sense also stand a better chance of becoming absorbed into the moral sphere of capitalism, either on the strength of widespread customary practice, or because such choices become the political will of legislators who get them inscribed into law.

Before we consider the material in part 3 of the volume, let us review some of the key ways that moral principles can be incorporated into the moral sphere of a capitalist economy:

1. Private individuals and groups can take charge of pushing for change (the focus of part 2).
2. Businesses and corporations can choose to enact moral standards of their own.
3. Governments can create regulations or a strong "environment" to encourage businesses to adopt certain moral principles.

The chapters comprising part 3 of the volume consider the second and third types of pressures that can impact the moral sphere. Here, I will draw attention where possible to the cost of moral choices, adding another dimension to my initial argument that all economies have a moral sphere, and to the subsequent discussion of the variable content and flexible nature of capitalist moral spheres. Chapters by Garsten and Hernes and Rajak suggest how transnational companies may be compelled to adopt standards of corporate social responsibility that ensure certain benefits. The different cases reveal two patterns: first, that the adoption of these principles is a strategic business decision, and second, that depending on the degree to which such standards are internalized, the associated costs can vary a great deal. By contrast, Pitluck's chapter offers a view of how an Asian state has embraced standards of socially responsible investing in ways that promise benefits to investors at a reasonably low cost. Together, these three cases offer ethnographic material that helps explain the variability of top-down choices and moral behavior across firms and states.

Moral Branding

There is mounting global pressure on capitalist enterprises to be seen as moral economic actors. In part, this pressure derives from a breathtaking number of moral breaches in recent years. On occasion, these cases—such as Tyco, Enron, and WorldCom—end up in ugly courtroom dramas where astonishing greed and corruption are exposed to a shocked public. Alongside these criminal violations of public trust stand the morally questionable tactics employed by many corporations that prey on society's vulnerability in the interests of profit at any cost. They target teens for cigarette sales; sell expired drugs and unload toxic waste in poor countries; sell arms to totalitarian governments; and price-gouge victims of disaster circumstances. They sell subprime real estate loans to people who have no financial capacity to repay the loan and market credit cards to college students and people already in debt. Even the lives of children are not exempt from exploitation.
by corporations seeking new markets. Fast food corporations that have secured school lunch contracts serve fried, fatty foods and sugary drinks, recklessly nurturing unhealthy cravings. In the transnational context, Stiglitz calls the phenomenon of global corporations scouring the world over for the cheapest workers and the weakest laws protecting labor and the environment “race to the bottom” (2006: 199). In all these cases, the cost of doing the right thing is presumably too high given the potential profits to be made by ignoring such moral concerns.

How does any economic system with a true morality allow such moral collapses? How is the sense of social good maintained when private interests abuse public faith in the system? In neoliberal capitalism, as discussed earlier, morality is written into a set of rights that assures the widest possible latitude for individuals and the smallest possible space for control by government. Having the right to make choices, however, also means bearing the burden of moral economic decisions. If people and firms do not bear this burden, if they make poor moral choices, society suffers.

When a moral breach is considered reprehensible, like marketing cigarettes to teens or selling expired drugs to developing nations, public outrage can sometimes bring about legislation to make such activities illegal. In these cases, the new laws add fresh content to the moral sphere. When an economic activity becomes strictly proscribed by law or custom, the permeable cells of the sphere absorb the new mandate. Once a principle or economic act becomes a constituent part of the moral sphere, such as antidiscrimination law, for example, it is better positioned to endure changing political tides, social backlashs, and the volatility of economic markets. Chances are better, but as George W. Bush’s eight-year administration has reminded us, there are no guarantees.35 If there are no prohibitions against morally problematic schemes that companies invent to extend their markets or improve their bottom line, they may well carry on with impunity and without censure (as tobacco companies do when they continue to heavily promote lethal products in developing countries).

Tracking moral accountability is not the business of a free market system, but in this moment of rapid, simultaneous communication around the globe, when problems of morality in business become apparent, the market can be called to account. Between traditional media coverage, Internet blogs, and activist monitoring in recent years, public awareness has dramatically increased, tagging the companies that risk public health and safety, abuse employees, breach contracts with consumers, or betray consumer trust. The convergence of such pressures has contributed to the institutionalization of voluntary moralities within capitalist systems such as fair trade, where standards of certification are meant to ensure better treatment of producers, CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) sometimes called Business Social Responsibility (BSR), and SRI (Socically Responsible Investing).

CSR is a rapidly growing philosophy that asserts an ethical commitment to do business according to certain guidelines.36 SRI represents a similar commitment that is growing in the world of financial markets. Because both of these systems are voluntary, the extent to which they may enlarge the moral sphere of capitalism in an evolutionary way depends on market factors. That is, can these companies remain competitive in the market, and are these behaviors important enough to consumers that they will selectively choose those companies they understand to be acting morally?

Christina Garsten and Tor Hernes (chapter 8) lay out a detailed review of the historical emergence of CSR and the new standards associated with it. Their research with dozens of CSR leaders helped them create a typology that describes the range of variation characterizing this emerging phenomenon. The benefits of becoming recognized as a CSR company are significant, particularly for publicly traded companies that depend on a corporate reputation to attract stockholders and capital. In their study, Garsten and Hernes profile the rise, fall, and struggle to rise again of a Norwegian dairy cooperative faced with dramatic changes in the public understanding of milk. After seventy years in business with the nutritious qualities of milk underrating the company’s success, the post–World War II era brought about new research that began to link milk fat to health problems. The authors show how the company adapted to the shifting views of milk through a variety of strategies including a stronger marketing orientation and the adoption of CSR standards. However, as Garsten and Hernes point out, intense market pressures and demands of shareholders and stakeholders ultimately led company leaders to make some unethical choices that were not preempted by their CSR commitments. The critical insight of this work reveals that a company’s embrace of ethical “standards” may be partial, and whether intentional or not, a partial commitment can mask problem areas that violate commonly accepted standards of moral conduct (as was the case with Enron, beloved benefactor of Houston, Texas). In effect, if CSR is just one strategy among many, rather than the prevailing company ethic, there is plenty of room for doublethink and internal contradiction.

It is useful to remember that being good in a commercial universe is likely to be part of a conscious business strategy because, after all, for-profit companies are in business to make a profit. Every community is home to some businesses that are known for their “people-first” policies. These companies certainly want to survive even if they are not organized around making the most money in the shortest time possible. But if the cost of being a moral player means your company could go broke, then you are obligated to find ways either to compromise profits or to set aside certain moral standards. It is no surprise that companies practicing CSR make every attempt to leverage a competitive “moral” edge by marketing their reputation. For them, whatever cost is involved in adopting these standards must be offset,
either by reducing other costs, increasing productivity, or attracting enough consumers who will agree to subsidize the added cost. When the moral commitment of a company is only partial, however, or relegated to a marketing principle alone, the limitations of CSR or any other attempt to promote good behavior become evident.

Dinah Rajak (chapter 9) presents an ethnographic look at a company’s commitment to CSR that goes deeper, permeating the organizational culture of the company. Her case points out how traditional corporate philanthropy is increasingly rebranded as morally led partnerships with the local community to promote sustainable development, enhancing the moral merit provided by the company’s very presence. Rajak’s fieldwork takes place in a South African mining operation run by the world’s largest platinum-producing company, based in London. Her study ties together several themes of the volume. She shows how the claims to moral purpose by company management suggest a near-spiritual mission to bring morality back into the workplace. Enacting this mission through the terms of CSR principles, company managers are quick to communicate their financial and emotional commitment to workers and to the community through the various projects the company supports. Rajak describes how Mauss’s ideas about the gift in “primitive” societies are relevant in thinking about how this version of CSR works. She explores how the categories of benefactor and recipient in this context function as they did in nonmarket societies to create a “logic of the gift.” Here, she argues, the gift of support to workers and their community acts to naturalize the authority of management on the one hand, while compelling a “return” gift of employee loyalty on the other. In effect, she says, the moral terms of CSR reassert asymmetrical, dependent relations.

In this South African context, the investment in employees and the community may represent a straightforward case of enlightened self-interest. By keeping the flow of gifts from the company in constant view, managers are able to maintain a positive public profile, keep the peace, and retain workers who remain in their debt. Rajak’s case reinforces the idea that when public goodwill can determine a company’s viability, investing in visibly moral conduct may be the necessary cost of doing business. In this sense, the cost to the company of doing good in order to remain viable is a worthwhile trade-off.

In line with the critical analyses of CSR practices by Garsten and Hermes and Rajak, Joseph Stiglitz notes the contradictions of many companies that claim to respect moral standards:

Today, all companies, even the worst polluters and those with the worst labor records, have hired public relations firms to laud their sense of corporate responsibility and their concern for the environment and workers’ rights. Corporations are becoming adept at image manipulation, and have learned to speak in favor of social responsibility even while they continue to evade it.

(2006: 199)

According to Stiglitz, the solution to such problems will require more than a campaign of social responsibility. In his view, the only solution is to enact regulations (e.g., positive moral principles) to mandate the terms of moral citizenship among market players. However, even if the realities of CSR standards are not matched by the appearances of do-good companies, the increasing cachet of claiming moral conscience works to raise the bar. If only out of enlightened self-interest, companies need to do well by their workers and by the needs of their communities. But they must also stay in business. Today, in business schools all over the world, there are new programs emerging in business ethics, sustainable business, and social entrepreneurship, all of which signal the increasing energy and investment in generating new models of capitalist moral economies. This profusion of efforts is aimed at carving out a new paradigm, one that may help level the costs of moral action by spreading the desire for higher standards across a majority of businesses. We may be tempted to call this window dressing or ideological manipulation, but because it is not yet clear where these new movements may lead, they merit our anthropological curiosity and scholarly attention.

Aaron Pitluck (chapter 10) demonstrates how moral choices by businesses can sometimes be very affordable when a state creates a set of incentives for moral accountability that are compatible with the local values. By comparing the world of high finance in two market economies—Malaysia and the United States, Pitluck argues that the different structure of incentives in these systems makes a real difference in the outcome of moral choices. The author introduces the concept of SRI that emerged in the West in the 1980s in association with social movements attempting to end investments in South African firms keeping the apartheid system alive. In other parts of the world, pan-Islamic social movements and oil wealth helped spur a system of “Islamic finance” conceived in the 1970s.

Pitluck describes how U.S. investors who communicate SRI preferences to money managers often exert little to no impact on redirecting corporate behavior toward such standards. The bottom-up system in which clients indicate their interest in making certain morally led investments ends up having little effect because the money managers that select the funds maintain a great deal of legal control in interpreting client preferences. Pitluck contrasts this situation with Malaysia where top-down government initiatives provide clear encouragement for companies to meet standards of business that explicitly reflect Islamic principles.

This comparative case study suggests the potential benefits of adhering to state-level incentives that reflect the moral values of a given cultural environment. As Pitluck shows, the coordinating initiative of the Malaysian government to collect and report data on publicly held companies in terms of their Shariah compliance puts significantly more pressure on companies to
comply, and the majority of businesses do. The cost of compliance to a
given company depends on the nature of its business, but all companies
share the cost of reporting and the cost of refraining from interest-bearing
financial instruments. In such a case, compliance presents more benefits
than costs. The potential profitability of Shariah-compliant companies is
underscored by the fact that there are large investable funds controlled by
Muslim individuals, organizations, and governments worldwide. A conserva-
tive estimate by Moody’s Investors Service, a credit rating agency, indicates
that there is approximately $550 billion in Islamic mutual funds and
Islamic banks alone (see Pitluck chapter, note 9).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Market economies function according to moral spheres that differ in scope
and content depending on the local political and social context in which
they operate. Unlike societies organized around gift exchange that impose
strict norms on the behavior of individuals, capitalist economies privilege
the choices of individuals and, therefore, allow for a wide range of moral
outcomes. But across capitalist economies, fundamental differences in philo-
sophy and policy exist. In welfare-state economies as in France or Sweden,
for example, the rights of individuals share political space with the rights of
everyone in society to access certain public goods. Thus, the moral sphere
of these societies assumes the cost of minimal provisioning for all by impos-
ing significant tax burdens on income earners and employers.37 It is no
coincidence that in welfare-state economies, there are much smaller gaps
between rich and poor38 than in neoliberal societies where the rights of in-
dividuals dominate. In the United States or Britain, the economic system
honors few rights of society; instead, individuals and businesses enjoy a sys-
tem with far fewer rules, regulations, and taxes.

It is also important to remember that the moral spheres of market
economies in non-Western societies reflect their own models of capitalist
logic. In the Asian Tiger economies of South Korea and Singapore, for ex-
ample, there is a strong, interventionist role for the state. Variable forms
of capitalism and the moral spheres distinguishing them also exist in
Latin American and African countries, differentiated often by the political
leadership of the moment. In the Malaysian instance discussed by Pitluck,
the state initiated top-down incentives for businesses to act ethically ac-

cording to Islamic laws of finance. If these same attempts at pressuring
moral conduct were tried in many other contexts, they would doubtless
be rejected.

But a relativistic position about differences in capitalist moral spheres
misses the political power of those systems that presume to dominate the
global economic field. Today, the American version of capitalist logic is
swiping other parts of Europe and most areas of the developing world. In
the last twenty-five years since neoliberal policy came to shape the U.S.
economy, the tenets of free choice embodied in this style of Western capi-
talism have been forced on many societies that, ironically, had no choice
but to accept them. Through IMF and World Bank requirements for aid and
debt relief, the market fundamentalism of neoliberal government has been
grafted onto societies irrespective of compatibility with the local rootstock,
their preparation, or their desire for such transformations. These grafts
require local economies to make “structural adjustments” to shrink the pub-
lic sector, privatize industry, and downsize social benefits.

Many anthropologists and sociologists who work on the ground in de-
veloping societies and bear firsthand witness to the ravages of imposed
neoliberal policies point out that the “freedoms” anticipated by liberal mar-
ket advocates are often less apparent than the grave problems these policies
have fostered—massive-scale poverty, unemployment, and increasing in-
equalities in health and education as well as income (Elyachar 2005: 214;
Escober 1995; Ferguson 1999, 2006: 11, 35). These failures relate in part to
the misguided assumptions in the West about the legitimacy of “scientific
capitalism” without regard for its need to be translated and made to work
in moral as well as technical terms. In Africa, says Ferguson, “The morality
of the market thus denies its own status as a morality, presenting itself as
mere technique” and so the move to neoliberal policies “will eventually
have to be taken up in a moral key in a way that recognizes the inevitable
connection of social, economic and cosmological orders” (2006: 80–81).
Julia Elyachar echoes the point that if free markets are to become success-
fully rooted in Egypt, policy makers must realize that “markets are social
and political worlds with their own cosmologies” and that, in addition to
translating a set of foreign processes in order to make them work in local
soil, “ethical attitudes” associated with these processes must also be explicit-
ly identified and translated (2005: 214). These recent studies suggest that
moral understandings and accountability reside at the center of the con-
tested terrain of economic change.39

The work comprising Economics and Morality presents a clear indication
that a new anthropological scholarship is emerging. It is no coincidence
that this fertile research landscape is opening up at a critical time in our history,
a time of profound economic change in the world and urgency to com-
hend how we can grasp and make good this uncharted future. As Bill Maur-
rer states in his eloquent afterword to this volume, in a post-foundation-

Our economic lives are full of choices, and our choices are full of mys-
teries. Studying moral frameworks, however tentative, can help us see into
the power, fear, and commitment woven into many of these choices. Anthropologists and ethnographers of all disciplines have much to offer this discussion. We learn from the authors how to view moral worlds, that help explain the local meaning and cost of moral actions. We learn how muscular economic forces and logics can compel moral change or adaptation. We learn most of all that the care of ethnographic work continues to provide insights into the deepest questions of humanity and how methodological ingenuity and courage are required to study ourselves without the baggage of our traditional sympathies.

NOTES

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1. Arguments about the place of morality in economic life go back a very long time and have appeared in many societies outside Europe and the United States. As Wilk and Cliggett note, "moral issues are never far from economic life, and the two are often hard to separate" (2007: 121–22).

2. As Eric Wolf (1982) and others have shown, it is increasingly problematic, given the flows of labor, ideas, goods, and so on, to assume a conceptual chasm between non-Western and Western societies. I use these terms advisedly, in part to express these very limitations.

3. There are exceptions. In philosophy, there are "applied" moral philosophers, such as Jeffrey Reiman (2007), who consider the moral dimensions of capitalist economies. In economics, there are "heterodox" and "institutional" schools of thought that attempt to challenge the dominant model of welfare economics based on its claims of moral concern for social welfare. As Hausman and McPherson point out, because the measure of social welfare is calculated from the sum of individual utilities, moral values have little role in economic analysis (2006: 92). Deirdre McCloskey is less restrained in her analysis of the claims of welfare economics, arguing that the "faint stirrings of complexity in ethical thought" are in fact better described as a "Victorian, utilitarian parrot, stuffed and mounted and fitted with remarkable eyes" (2006: 195).

4. Marshall Sahlins took up the issue in *Stone Age Economics* (1972) as did structural Marxists like Godelier (1986) and formalist and substantivist anthropologists. More recent anthropological treatments of morality and economics can be seen in Bloch (2006); Bloch and Parry (1989); Austin-Broos (1996); Parry (1986); Smart (1997); Carrier (1997); Robbins (2004); and Laidlaw (2002).

5. Many new books have appeared in recent years decriying the sublime of ethical problems that have come to plague capitalism. One best-selling example is David Callahan’s *The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead* (2004), in which the author points to the increasingly competitive global environment that has nurtured a startling devotion in the moral standards of business. Along this line, anthropologists have become more concerned to investigate corruption in various forms, as evidenced by books like *Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective* (Nuijten 2007); *Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World* (Northcrom 2007); and *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other Side of Globalization* (van Schendel and Abraham 2003).

6. Frank Canavan’s insightful analysis (1966) showed how the great divide might have been reconciled if both sides had realized that they were simply debating the definition of maximization. Canavan’s argument did not, however, help the sides see eye to eye, and the debate fizzled out without a winner. Still today, these points of view are commonly seen to divide economic anthropologists from economists (Wilk and Cliggett 2007: 13).

7. Thompson (1991: 336–37) borrowed the term from late eighteenth-century critics of capitalism who had drawn comparisons between economic action for the good of all and "the laissez-faire 'political economy' espoused by 'quacks,' a history Edelman details (2005: 33). However, William James Booth points out that the idea of a "moral economy" had its origins in the Aristotelian notion of how to best fulfill a "good life." Following this line of thinking, Booth asserts that the moral economy was not a reference at all to the marketplace but, rather, to a life of leisure and freedom to participate in the life of the city. The "oikos" or household in Aristotle’s time was thus organized around the "moral economy" of ensuring the master’s freedom so that he could pursue his greatest potential for active citizenship (Booth 1994).

8. In his famous 1965 article, George Foster drew on fieldwork with Mexican peasants to propose the idea that the moral universe of peasants is different from capitalist morality because peasants act in accordance with an "image of limited good." For them, he said, all good things are in limited supply, so that any attempt to maximize gains in one area necessarily depletes resources in another. Eric Wolf subsequently (1966) showed that these "cognitive" orientations could more easily be explained by structural realities.

9. Marxist critiques, in particular, are primarily concerned with the fact of the capitalist’s control over the labor of others, rendering the majority of people “alienated" from their own work and self.

10. Thanks to Bill Maurer for pointing me to these ideas.

11. Hirschman notes that the moral critiques of capitalism that have since arisen suggest a twist on Weber’s formulation: rather than a case of "unintended consequences," Hirschman’s story reveals how the "intended consequence" of building a moral society through the promotion of self interest was not realized. Instead, "capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature" (Hirschman 1997 [1977]: 132).

12. Georg Simmel (1978) argued that as early as the advent of money and the concomitant possibility of exchange between distant parties, a new cognitive orientation had developed, one focused on rational calculation. This new way of thinking loosened the grip of bonds to kin and community, and in its place, fostered connections of trust to a much larger social universe (Bloch and Parry 1989: 4-5).
13. One of the most eloquent and forceful displays of such an effort is Deirdre McCloskey's recent work *The Bourgeois Virtues* (2006). McCloskey argues that Smith's command and embrace of virtue ethics is the template we need to return to now in order to fully enact the terms of a morally led capitalism in Smith's vision. For other examples of this trend, see Foley (2006), Sen (1999), Levits (2005).

14. Neoliberal ideas arose in the 1970s in the United States and Britain as opposition to the dominant Keynesian model of economic policy that allowed for a strong state. However, advocates of neoliberal ideas tend to accept a greater role for the state than do libertarian thinkers who typically argue that the state should be limited to the absolute minimum required to protect citizenry and their property from foreign or domestic harm.

15. Pervasive economist Hernando de Soto (2000) argues that secure property rights are the key to the success of capitalist economies and to relieving poverty in the developing world. DeSoto's ideas have taken root in international development circles. For a useful discussion of new forms of global, "accelerated" property rights, see Bill Maurer and Gabriele Schwab (2006).

16. However, the idea of rights to certain public goods is not absent in all or even most capitalist societies.

17. The Question of the Gift (Osteen 2002) is an excellent recent volume focused on revisiting Mauss's work using contributors from across several disciplines. Keith Hart has also revisited the Maussian legacy in interesting ways (2005, 2007).

18. This divide suggests a striking continuity with the century-old Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft concept separating rural from town life and the moral propriety in the former as compared to the moral wasteland of the latter, articulated by Tönnies in 1887.


20. See William James Booth for an extensive treatment of the arguments about embedded, "moral" economies and "disembedded" capitalist economies (Booth 1994).

21. Many "non-Western" societies have been interacting with market economies for a very long time. What distinguishes these interactions is the nature and degree of integration with capitalist economies. For treatments of these issues see Wolf (1982); Wilk and Cliggett (2007); McCloskey (2006).

22. "Shakespeare in the Bush" (1966) presents a wonderful lesson based on Böhnans's bet that a story as basic in its moral structure as Hamlet, would translate easily among the Tiv in West Africa with whom she had worked for many years. To her surprise, however, almost immediately upon recounting the story to a group of Tiv, questions began popping up, interrupting her tale and forcing her to defend the story line in spite of their efforts to rewrite it in ways that made sense. Ultimately, the Tiv chiefs reinterpreted the story to fit the moral universe of the Tiv, reassuring Böhnans that she now understood the true tale.

23. A small but growing number of economists, economic historians, and economic sociologists have attempted to propose revisions to this utilitarian model of capitalist economies specifying the importance of moral influences to economic decision making. Some of the prominent critics represented by these alternative approaches include for example, Amartya Sen (1999), Joseph Stiglitz (2006), Ha-Joon Chang (2007), and Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson (2006).

24. For another ethnographic example of this pattern, see Carsten (1989).

25. Mark Granovetter has contributed valuable insights about how social relations shape individual action in market economies (1985).

26. Economic historians and anthropologists now recognize that markets in land and labor existed well before European mercantilism, in the European Middle ages when "more was for sale, arguably, than is now: husbands, wives, slaves, serfs, kingdoms, market days, and eternal salvation" (Hegeba and McCloskey 2004: 13; see also Wilk and Cliggett 2007: 11). For a thorough account of the rise of capitalism, see Wolf (1982).

27. Bill Roseberry makes the point that in the process of commodification, wherever resources were held by families for the use of all, these resources had to be withdrawn from group access, their socially vested character purged, and inside/outside boundaries dictating access dissolved (1997: 256).

28. Durkheim's "social facts" (1893 [1895]) represented the collective consciousness of group-based norms such that anyone found to violate one would feel the scorn of the others and be brought into line.

29. Nobel Prize economist Joseph Stiglitz (2006: 191) notes that lobbyists for forty-one U.S. companies "contributed" $150 million to federal political campaigns between 1991 and 2001, and in three years alone, benefited from $55 billion in tax breaks. The lobbying success of pharmaceutical companies is even more astonishing, as Stiglitz demonstrates.

30. Still, as a recent New York Times article points out, beverage companies continue to stock school vending machines with sugared waters, teas, and juices (Martin 2007).

31. According to the nonprofit organization United for a Fair Economy, in 2006, CEOs of large U.S. corporations averaged compensation packages of $10.8 million, more than 346 times the pay of the average U.S. worker. The top twenty private equity and hedge fund managers earned an average of $657.5 million, a stunning 22,255 times the pay of the average U.S. worker (www.fooneconomy.org).

32. The economic logic of fair trade involves cutting out middlemen marketing groups and ensuring a fair return to producers. Fair trade also requires some financial commitment to local communities of producers. For a critical assessment of the problems and potential of the fair-trade movement, see Raynolds et al. (2007).

33. I learned firsthand about the indignities and economic hardships faced by Katrina survivors during my research and film collaboration with Cinny Martin, filmmaker. We followed a large African American family of 155 people over eighteen months and witnessed their hope and optimism slowly degrade over time as a result of unresponsive and mysterious bureaucracies they were made to depend on. Still Waiting: Life after Katrina (2007) was broadcast on PBS in 2007 and 2008.

34. As Dolan points out, the perception by consumers that they are participating in relieving poverty and unequal relations with outsiders is not necessarily the reality. Fair-trade arrangements help the community and ensure the continuity of work, but laborers on these plantations still work for very modest wages.

35. The Bush administration has successfully dismantled large chunks of longstanding environmental regulations and civil rights of citizens (McKbben 2007).

36. According to a LexisNexis search, between 1978 and 2007, there were a total of 3,720 articles in "major world publications," with the term "corporate social responsibility" appearing in the headline or lead paragraph. More telling is the fact that 95 percent of these articles (3,530) have appeared since 2001.
37. In France, at least until recently, when transportation workers demanded better pay, their cause was routinely taken up by workers in other sectors who strike "in solidarity." Welfare-state economies condition citizens to tolerate fewer choices and higher costs for the benefits of an economic structure that builds in prescriptive moral behavior. Today, in France, however, the Sarkozy government is stepping up the neoliberal reforms begun by Chirac, forcing a contraction of the moral sphere of French society.

38. Many welfare-state societies are facing unprecedented fiscal crises impacting their capacity to support the publicly funded salaries and numbers of programs dedicated to benefiting society. The unsustainable budgets relate to the costs of aging populations, rising health care costs, and swelling numbers of new residents from formerly colonized areas who are accessing their share of benefits.

39. The World Resources Institute, an environmental policy think tank founded in 1982, has recently issued a report entitled, Development without Conflict: The Business Case for Community Consent in which they recommend that "informed consent of a community affected by development projects . . . makes good business sense" (www.wri.org/publication/content/7800).

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